What is the onus of a judge to grant a bifurcation order?

The onus in applications for a bifurcation order is always on the applicant. On the facts of this case, I am satisfied that the judge addressed his mind to the proper factors when, after reciting the criteria which he considered had been satisfied, he declared that he was satisfied that the severance of the proceedings would "more likely than not result in the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of the proceedings on the merits". I do not take his reference to justifying a departure from past practice as imposing upon the appellant a burden which it would not otherwise have had. Once there was evidence before the judge upon which he could conclude that an order could properly be granted, the appellant was in the position where its failure to lead evidence exposed it to the risk of an adverse result. This has been referred to as the tactical burden: It is not strictly accurate to speak of the burden shifting to the defendant when what is meant is that evidence adduced by the plaintiff may result in an inference being drawn adverse to the defendant. Whether an inference is or is not drawn is a matter of weighing evidence. The defendant runs the risk of an adverse inference in the absence of evidence to the contrary. This is sometimes referred to as imposing on the defendant a provisional or tactical burden. Snell v. Farrell, 1990 CanLII 70 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 at p. 319-320 per Sopinka J.