What is the test of willful blindness in the mens rea of fraud?

The mens rea of the offence of fraud can be satisfied by the proof of willful blindness. In Regina v. Drabinsky, the court considered the meaning of the mens rea of fraud in relation to the subjective belief held by an accused that his conduct was not dishonest or that deprivation was not intended, stating the following: The question is whether the accused subjectively appreciated that certain consequences would follow from his act, not whether he believed they were moral: "...the defrauder will not be acquitted because he believed what he was doing was honest”. The fact that the accused may have hoped deprivation would not occur or may have thought what he was doing was not wrong is no defense. Where the accused knowingly undertook the acts in question aware that deprivation or risk of deprivation could follow, the accused is guilty. This is so whether he actually intended the consequences or was reckless as to whether they would occur. In other words a "sanguine belief that all will come out right in the end" is not a defense. "Many frauds" are perpetrated by people who think there is nothing wrong with what they are doing or who think it will turn out alright in the end.[2]