What is the balance between freedom of speech and integrity of the administration of justice?

With the foregoing in mind, Brennan, J. opined that the balance sought to be achieved required a demarcation in a given case of the boundary between legitimate public discussion of topics of public interest and discussion amounting to punishable contempt of court. He noted that in Hinch v. Attorney-General, supra, the boundary between the integrity of the administration of justice and freedom of public expression was defined in differing terms. He explained (at p. 613): “... Mason C.J. held the boundary to be crossed when the publication created a substantial risk of serious interference with a fair trial [(1987), 164 C.L.R. at pp. 27-28.] Wilson J. adopted the formulation of a real and definite tendency to prejudice or embarrass pending proceedings, [ibid at p. 34]; a similar formulation was adopted by Deane J. [ibid, at pp. 54-55] and by Toohey J. [ibid., at p. 70]. Gaudron J. held that, to constitute contempt, there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the impugned conduct ‘poses a real risk to the administration of justice’ though the court must decide as a matter of law whether any competing public interest ‘outweighs the degree of risk’ established.” [ibid at p. 87].