Is imputed knowledge imputed when a member of the Law Society of Upper Canada is involved in a fraudulent transaction?

In Law Society of Upper Canada v. Kadir Baksh, [2004] L.S.D.D. No. 24 (ONLSHP) at para. 57 the following passage is noted: It is possible that on the first occasion and perhaps even a second occasion the member might have been taken in and partially excused. But that does not excuse subsequent failures. By the time of the second or at least the third transaction he knew or should have known that a fraud was in progress. At that point the concept of imputed knowledge couldn’t apply because (on the facts that will be analyzed) it should have been obvious to the member that the lending institutions didn’t in fact know.

LSUC v. De Landro, [2006] L.S.D.D. 10 at para. 129 states, “the evidence demonstrates that the member deviated so substantially and so repeatedly from the standards of a reasonably competent solicitor in the real estate field, and from the instructions given to him by his lender clients and from his undertakings, that the only logical inference that can be drawn from his actions is that the member “knowingly” participated in this wrongful conduct.”