Can a husband's agreement to sell his homestead be used as a basis for damages?

Our Homestead Act was passed for the purpose of preventing a husband from disposing of the homestead without the consent of his wife, given without compulsion and of her own free will. Although the Act gives the wife an interest in the homestead independent of her husband, it must not be forgotten that they are still man and wife, with, in most respects, interests which are identical. The prosperity of the husband generally speaking means the prosperity of the wife, while any losses sustained by him are losses which she must share. If, therefore, the husband enters into an agreement to sell the homestead, and if it be held that his wife’s refusal to consent to the sale results in the husband being mulcted in heavy damages for breach of his contract, which damages will be so much loss to their joint estate, it seems to me that the freedom of will and the absence of compulsion which the statute requires on the part of the wife would be very greatly interfered with. In many of such cases I fear the wife would be found making a declaration that she was signing the conveyance of her own free will, when, in fact, she was doing so very reluctantly, and under the compulsion, which threatened loss by way of heavy damages for her husband’s breach of contract, would exert upon her. To put this species of compulsion upon a wife seems to me to be entirely inconsistent with the spirit of the Act. In view, however, of the conclusion at which I have arrived on the first ground above mentioned, it is not necessary in this case that I express a concluded opinion as to whether in any case an agreement by a husband to dispose of the homestead, along with other property, can be made the basis of an action for damages in the absence of the wife’s consent thereto, or whether the purchaser’s remedy is not confined to specific performance of the agreement as far as the vendor can give it, with compensation for the homestead, as in Halldorson v. Holiski, supra. Being unnecessary in this case, the point may well remain open until a case arises in which its determination becomes necessary.