What is the current state of the law of defamation in Canada?

Cory J. rejected the contention that Canadian law should follow New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, do away with [page262] the presumptions of falsity and malice and require a "public figure" plaintiff to prove that the defendant either knew the statements to be false or was reckless as to the truth. He read New York Times v. Sullivan as being largely the product of the American anti-segregation, civil rights movement of the 1960s. Cory J. cited articles by critics of the decision who complained that the "public figure" category was uncertain, that the focus of libel suits shifted from the truth of impugned statements to the conduct of the defendant, that the malice requirement increased the cost and complexity of litigation, and that the value of truth in public discourse had been deprecated. He noted that while England and Australia had modified the law of defamation, neither had adopted the actual malice requirement. Cory J. wrote, at para. 137: "I simply cannot see that the law of defamation is unduly restrictive or inhibiting. Surely it is not requiring too much of individuals that they ascertain the truth of the allegations they publish" (emphasis added).