Does a judge have to take into account all substantial possibilities and give them weight according to their relative likelihood?

The defendant refers to the decision in Parypa v. Wickware, 1999 BCCA 88, 169 D.L.R. (4th) 661 at para. 67 for the proposition that the judge was required to take into account all substantial possibilities and give them weight according to their relative likelihood. The defendant submits the judge committed an error of law or an error of mixed fact and law because she failed to consider the extent of any real and substantial possibilities of an actual income loss and to then attribute them weight according to their relative likelihood. I am not persuaded that the judge made such an error. The judge was not required to articulate all of the substantial possibilities and assign a specific weight to them. She was alive to the existence of contingencies and possibilities, and took them into account when assessing the damagesw for the impairment to the plaintiff’s future earning capacity. As noted at para. 69 of Parypa, the task of the court is to assess the damages, not calculate them according to a mathematical formula. Although it may have been preferable for the trial judge to have given a fuller explanation with respect to her assessment of the damages, it is my opinion that her reasons as a whole were sufficient in that regard.