What is the test for establishing that an agreement is not a conspiracy?

In Papalia, Dickson J. noted that the object of an agreement is not the same as the indictable offence. At 285, he noted that “[t]he indictable offence in the abstract, as it was set out in this case, cannot be set up as, or confused with, the "object" of the conspiracy. One must look to the facts to find the object.” In that same decision, Dickson J. discussed the special nature of the charge of conspiracy and the effect of that special nature on defining the core of the offence to be proven. At 276, he commented: [T]he indictment for conspiracy is a formidable weapon in the armoury of the prosecutor. According to the cases, it permits a vague definition of the offence; broader standards of admissibility of evidence apply; it may provide the solution to prosecutorial problems as to situs and jurisdiction. See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot, [[1973] A.C. 807]. But the very looseness generally allowed for specifying the offence, for receiving proof, and generally in the conduct of the trial, imposes upon a trial judge an added duty to ensure against the possibility of improper transference of guilt from one accused to another. There is, I have no doubt, a subconscious tendency upon the part of jurors in a conspiracy case to regard all co-conspirators alike and ignore the fact that guilt is something individual and personal.