What is the test for exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter when evidence is recovered after a Charter violation?

The approach to be taken in these kinds of cases is described in more detail by Dickson C.J.C. in Regina v. Strachan, supra: Ordinarily only a few Charter rights, ss. 8, 9 and 10, will be relevant to the gathering of evidence and therefore to the remedy of exclusion under s.24(2). So long as a violation of one of these rights precedes the discovery of the evidence, for the purposes of the first stage of s.24(2) it makes little sense to draw distinctions based on the circumstances surrounding the violation or the type of evidence recovered. A better approach, in my view, would be to consider all evidence gathered following a violation of a Charter right, including the right to counsel, as within the scope of s. 24(2). In my view, all the pitfalls of causation may be avoided by adopting an approach that focuses on the entire chain of events during which the Charter violation occurred and the evidence was obtained. Accordingly, the first inquiry under s.24(2) would be to determine whether a Charter violation occurred in the course of obtaining the evidence. A temporal link between the infringement of the Charter and the discovery of the evidence figures prominently in this assessment, particularly where the Charter violation and the discovery of the evidence occur in the course of a single transaction. The presence of a temporal connection is not, however, determinative. Situations will arise where evidence, though obtained following the breach of the Charter right, will be too remote from the violation to be "obtained in a manner" that infringed the Charter. In my view, these situations should be dealt with on a case by case basis. There can be no hard and fast rule for determining when evidence obtained following the infringement of a Charter right becomes too remote.