How have the courts interpreted the text of the Financial Conduct Code in the context of an executrix’s claim against a bank?

Let us see now how far the decided cases have followed the text laid down by the authorities. In Farhall v. Farhall, L.R. 7 Ch. 123, at p. 125, 41 L.J. Ch. 146, James, L.J., lays down the following rule: In this case it seems to me quite clear that there was no legal debt due from the estate to the bank. The executrix borrows money as executrix, says that she is executrix, and the bank debit her as executrix. To say that this charges the estate would give executors power to create debts to an unlimited extent. The executor has the power to realize the personal estate and to pledge specific assets, which is one mode of realizing them. Here the executor has also power to pledge the realty; and I have myself, by a former order, given the bankers the full benefit of the charge they had on part of the real estate, and held them not answerable for any devastavit the executrix committed as to the moneys raised by that mortgage. But to say that the executrix can, by borrowing money, enable the person who has lent it to stand as a creditor upon the estate, is a position supported by no authority and no principle. The contract is with the executrix; there is no loan to the estate; there is no credit given to the estate; the credit is given only to the person who borrows, though the money may be borrowed for the purposes of the estate.