One is always reluctant, as I surely am in this instance, to conclude that evidence has not been truthfully given. After hearing and watching the defendant I am driven, however, to the conclusion that she was being other than factual when advancing at trial the “crack in the pavement” theory. Having rejected the veracity of that explanation as advanced by the defence through principally the defendant but also through the evidence of her father who surveyed the accident scene with her the following day, there remains an absence of evidence as to the specifics of why or how the accident took place. Some other portions of the defendant’s evidence at trial were less than convincing, particularly when related to questions and answers placed in evidence from the examination-for-discovery and the cross-examination that was conducted at trial on that examination. I have particularly in mind the suggestion at trial that the steering mechanism became defective prior to making contact with the crossroad. Further, I believe I am entitled to imply as a result of the defendant’s performance at trial as just commented upon, that had she been truthful at trial her evidence would not have been favourable towards her. A similar implication was drawn in Doxtator v. Burch, supra, where the defendant failed to testify at trial.
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