What is the burden of proof in a quasi-criminal proceeding?

The court noted in Hanes, supra, referring to Denning L.J. in Bater v. Bater, [1950] 2 All E.R. 458 at p. 459, that although quasi-criminal proceedings still invoke a burden of proof on a balance of probabilities, there might be degrees of probability within the standard. Degrees will vary depending on the subject matter involved: The case may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject matter. A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will naturally require a higher degree of probability than that which it would require if considering whether negligence were established. It does not adopt so high a degree as a criminal court, even when it is considering a charge of a criminal nature, but still it does require a degree of probability which is commensurate with the occasion.