What is the test for giving a plaintiff a reasonable cause in a claim for damages arising out of an alleged threat to their lives, liberty and especially their security?

Thus, taking the allegations of the statement of claim literally, it can be seen that the plaintiffs speak of a threat to their lives, liberty and especially their security, as the result of a dangerous situation which would only be future and hypothetical in nature and would depend essentially on the possible reaction of a foreign power. Are such allegations sufficient in themselves to meet the third of the conditions stated above for the action to be given a reasonable cause? This would seem to me very difficult to contend. The function of the judiciary is, in principle, to state the law applicable to a present, not purely contingent and future, set of circumstances, on the basis of facts the existence of which is at least probable, not merely possible and hypothetical, in order to resolve an issue between present and compellable parties, not those beyond its jurisdiction. It is impossible to think that the courts can be called upon to deal with mere potential situations, that they are entitled to base their conclusions and directives on speculations, assumptions and conjectures coupled with hopes and expectations, and that they have the means to make absent persons subject to their orders. (See on these points the observations of Lord Denning, M.R. in Blackburn v. Attorney-General, [1971] 2 All E.R. 1380.)