What is the test for a court to order security in a construction application?

In Kropp v. Swanest Bay Golf Course Ltd., [1977] B.C.J. No. 593 (B.C.C.A.), Finch J.A. (as he was then), at paragraph 17, distilled the following principles from a review of various authorities, including specifically Keary Development v. Tarmac Construction, [1995] 3 All E.R. 534: 1. The court has a complete discretion whether to order security, and will act in light of all the relevant circumstances; 2. The possibility or probability that the plaintiff company will be deterred from pursuing its claim is not without more sufficient reason for not ordering security; 3. The court must attempt to balance injustices arising from use of security as an instrument of oppression to stifle a legitimate claim on the one hand, and use of impecuniosity as a means of putting unfair pressure on a defendant on the other; 4. The court may have regard to the merits of the action, but should avoid going into detail on the merits unless success or failure appears obvious; 5. The court can order any amount of security up to the full amount claimed, as long as the amount is more than nominal; 6. Before the court refuses to order security on the ground that it would unfairly stifle a valid claim, the court must be satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is probable that the claim would be stifled; and 7. The lateness of the application for security is a circumstance which can properly be taken into account.