What is the effect of no-fault benefits on a plaintiff's interest rate?

Such a result, I venture to suggest, does not accord with the concept of fairness expressed by Taylor J. in Gillis v. Bates supra, but it is in accordance with the wording of the two statutes in question. It leaves it open to the defendant to refrain from paying no-fault benefits until the eve of trial and then, by paying them, to wipe out the plaintiff's right to interest back to the date when the cause of action rose. That is not the case here, for the benefits appear to have been paid at fair and reasonable intervals while the cause awaited trial. Were it otherwise, a trial judge might temper any injustice by adjusting the rate of interest. I remark on that not to suggest that others should do it as much as to draw the attention of the legislators to the discrepancy between the result of the statutes as presently worded and the judgment in Gillis v. Bates.