What is the test for a contract where the contract states that a ship called the “Peerless” will not be delivered?

Sigurdson J. went on to observe as follows at para. 76 of his Reasons: Where parties are at cross-purposes and the apparent agreement is capable of either interpretation, there is no agreement. In Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864), 159 E.R. 375, the defendant purchased cotton from the plaintiff “to arrive ex “Peerless” from Bombay”; the defendant pleaded that he meant a ship called the “Peerless” which sailed from Bombay in October, whereas the plaintiff was not ready to deliver any cotton which arrived by that ship, but only cotton which arrived by another ship called the “Peerless” which sailed from Bombay in December. Although the question being determined was procedural in nature, the court held: There is nothing on the face of the contract to show that any particular ship called the “Peerless” was meant; but the moment it appears that two ships called the “Peerless” were about to sail from Bombay there is a latent ambiguity and parol evidence may be given for the purpose of shewing that the defendant mean one “Peerless,” and the plaintiff another. That being so, there was no consensus ad idem, and therefore no binding contract. (emphasis added)