Can delay per se constitute prejudice and justify striking out a jury notice?

The recognition of delay per se as causing prejudice was accepted in the subsequent panel decision in Louis v. Poitras, 2021 ONCA 49, 456 D.L.R. (4th) 164, where Hourigan J.A. wrote, at para. 22: [T]he motion judge found that “the real and substantial prejudice arises simply by reason of delay”: at para. 46. I agree with the statement of Brown J.A. in his decision on the stay motion that this was a legally permissible finding and that “delay in obtaining a date for a civil jury trial can, by itself, constitute prejudice and justify striking out a jury notice.” As Brown J.A. notes, the whole raison d’être of the civil justice system, as captured in r. 1.04(1), is that courts will work to provide the “most expeditious…determination of every civil proceeding on its merits”: Louis v. Poitras, 2020 ONCA 815, at para. 33.