What is the test for the doctrine of "comity" in the context of an interprovincial claim?

The court, at page 51 of Muscugtt, supra, recognized the formulation of the concept of comity as adopted by LaForest J. in Morguard, supra, at page 1096 from Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 at pp. 163-64 (1895): [T]he recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws… The court then continued, at pages 51-52: One aspect of comity is that in fashioning jurisdictional rules, courts should consider the standards of jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement that prevail elsewhere. In interprovincial cases, this consideration is unnecessary, since the same standard necessarily applies to assumed jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement within Canada. However, in international cases, it may be helpful to consider international standards, particularly the rules governing assumed jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in the location in which the defendant is situated. …As discussed above, in the United States, the minimum contacts doctrine requires an act or conduct on the part of the defendant that amounts to personal subjection to the jurisdiction. Without more, damage sustained in the jurisdiction does not satisfy the doctrine. In the present case there is no “act or conduct” on the part of either of the two moving parties-defendants which, in my opinion, is tantamount to “personal subjection to the jurisdiction”.