Is there a difference between an assignment of shares standing in the name of any person in trust for the debtor and a fraudulent assignment?

In Caffrey v. Phelps the distinction is drawn between shares standing “in the name of any person in trust” for the debtor and shares which have been fraudulently assigned in order to avoid execution and it was held on the facts of that case that there was no trust as between the debtor and his assignees. All the parties to the transaction swore that it was made for valuable consideration and that the assignees were bona-fide holders of the shares. Under those circumstances, whatever rights the creditors might have had under The Statute of Elizabeth, the assignment was good as between the debtor and the assignees, and no question of trust could therefore arise. The charging order only places the creditor in as favourable a position as he would have been in if the charge had been made in his favour by the judgment debtor, and as the assignment was good as between the debtor and his assignees, the debtor “could not revoke it or undo it by making another charge in favour of another person.”