What is the test for a cap on non-pecuniary damages for sexual abuse?

On the question of whether there should be a cap on awards of non-pecuniary damages for sexual abuse, the court reasoned as follows at paragraph 30: I am not persuaded that the policy reasons which gave rise to the imposition of a cap in "the trilogy" have any application in a case of the type at bar. In my opinion the differences described by Cory J. [Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto 1995 CanLII 59 (SCC), [1995], 2 S.C.R. 1130] exist in this case as well. The policy considerations which arise from negligence causing catastrophic personal injuries, in the contexts of accident and medical malpractice, do not arise from intentional torts involving criminal behaviour. There is no evidence before us that this type of case has any impact on the public purse, or that there is any crisis arising from the size and disparity of assessments. A cap is not needed to protect the general public from a serious social burden, such as enormous insurance premiums. Insofar as damage awards may be so high as to be wholly erroneous, or wholly disproportionate, an appellate court may intervene to correct disparity, and to foster consistency. In contrast, sexual abuse claims do not usually result in awards guaranteeing lifetime economic security. In the catastrophic personal injury cases, awards under other heads of damages are so high that there may be a lesser need for general damages to provide solace and to substitute for lost amenities. In some cases, sexual abuse victims may require and deserve more than the "cap" allows, due to the unpredictable impact of the tort on their lives. Judges, juries and appellate courts are in a position to decide what is fair and reasonable to both parties according to the circumstances of the case.