What is the effect of a foreign prosecutor’s impartiality in the context of an extradition hearing?

The appellant will obviously have the opportunity in Louisiana to raise any concerns about the objectivity of the prosecutor. I think his real point is that his concerns will go unheeded, and he will not receive a fair trial. In my opinion, this point is answered by the following passages from Argentina v. Mellino, 1987 CanLII 49 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536 at 554-55: In particular, it is not the business of an extradition judge to assume responsibility for reviewing the actions of foreign officials in preparing the evidence for an extradition hearing. This would seem to me to be in breach of the most elementary dictates of comity between sovereign states. … … The assumption that the requesting state will give the fugitive a fair trial according to its laws underlies the whole theory and practice of extradition and our courts have over many years made it abundantly clear that an extradition judge should not give effect to any suggestion that the proceedings are oppressive or that the fugitive will not be given a fair trial or give proper weight to the evidence. In truth, the assumption by an extradition judge that delay or other defences would not be given appropriate consideration by the foreign court is even more offensive than the assumption of control over the actions of foreign diplomatic and prosecutorial officials. It amounts to a serious adverse reflection not only on a foreign government to whom Canada has a treaty obligation but on its judicial authorities concerning matters that are exclusively within their competence.