What is the true nature of Rule 18A of the Rules of Civil Procedure?

The true nature of the discretion was set out by Taggart J.A. in Placer v. Skyline at p. 27 [pp. 385-86 B.C.L.R.]: Clearly the opening language of subr. (3) of R. 18A contemplates the possibility of judgment being entered on one or more or all issues raised by the pleadings. But that contemplation is, for the judge hearing the application, tempered by the language of paras. (a) and (b) of subr. (3). They clothe the judge with a broad discretion to refuse to proceed with the application where he decides he cannot find the facts necessary to decide the issues of fact or law or if it would be unjust to decide the issues raised on the application. [The italics are mine.] There is a broad discretion to refuse to proceed with the application, that is, to refuse to grant judgment. There is also a broad discretion to make interlocutory orders under subr. (5). But there is no discretion to grant judgment. If judgment goes, it goes as a matter of right, not as a matter of discretion. And that is true whether it goes after a trial or after a hearing under R. 18A. Taggart J.A. summed the matter up in this way in Placer v. Skyline at p. 28 [p. 386 B.C.L.R.]: In summary, the rule is a means whereby the general principles stated by R. 1(5) may be attained. The rule must, however, be applied only where it is possible to do justice between the parties in accordance with the requirements of the rule itself and in accordance with the general principles which govern judges in their daily task of ensuring that justice is done. 8. Rule 18A: the decision on the facts