How have common-law spouses been excluded from the presumptive common law protections?

Having so found, to paraphrase para. 357 of Quebec v. A, there is no need to look for an attitude of prejudice motivating, or created by, the exclusion of common-law spouses from the presumptive common law protections. Nor is it necessary to consider whether their exclusion promotes the view that the members of the claimant group are less capable or worthy of recognition as human beings or citizens. What is relevant is not the attitudes towards the members of the claimant group but the continuation of their discriminatory treatment.

I conclude by noting that a full consideration of the effect of the exclusion must include the impact on witness spouses, whose exclusion spares them the significant disadvantage of being rendered testimonially incompetent. However, as this consideration is inextricably intertwined with the notion of choice, for the reasons given by the majority in Quebec v. A, it is relevant to the s. 1 analysis, which follows. SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER