On the basis of the Guidelines and Section 3661 of the Criminal Code, can the exclusionary rule be applied in the context of search warrant searches?

On the other hand, in subsequent cases we have narrowed and revamped Verdugo to harmonize the case more closely with the prevailing view that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedial device whose contours are delimited by means of a utilitarian calculus of deterrence versus lost probative evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir.1975). Because this nettlesome issue is not dispositive and was not briefed by the parties, we decline to decide whether the Guidelines and Section 3661 foreclose the application of Verdugo's judicially-crafted remedial device to sentencing and, like the majority in McCrory, "leave open the question whether suppression would be necessary and proper at the sentencing phase where it is shown that the police acted egregiously, e.g., by undertaking a warrantless search for the very purpose of obtaining evidence to increase a defendant's sentence." McCrory, 930 F.2d at 69, citing Verdugo, 402 F.2d at 611-613.