On appeal, how has the Court treated a motion to suppress or destroy evidence?

On appeal, we appointed counsel, who filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, setting forth the facts of the case and requesting we review the entire record on appeal for arguable issues. Appellant submitted a supplemental brief, claiming the trial court erred in denying his Youngblood ³ motion, and his new trial motion based on the same subject.

Appellant contends the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss or suppress evidence pursuant to California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 and Arizona v. Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. 51, made at trial and reiterated in his new trial motion. More specifically, appellant claims he was denied due process because a gunshot residue test was either not taken on Loaiza or the results were not preserved. We disagree.

It is well established that the police have no obligation to collect evidence for the defense (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 663-665; People v. Wimberly (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 773, 791.) However, "[l]aw enforcement agencies have a duty, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to preserve evidence 'that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense.' [Citations.] To fall within the scope of this duty, the evidence 'must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.' [Citations.]" (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 509-510, quoting California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 488-489.) " '[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.' " (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1042, quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S at p. 58.) The United States

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