Is unconsciousness a defense to a criminal charge?

"Unconsciousness, if not induced by voluntary intoxication, is a complete defense to a criminal charge. [Citations.] To constitute a defense, unconsciousness need not rise to the level of coma or inability to walk or perform manual movements; it can exist `where the subject physically acts but is not, at the time, conscious of acting.' [Citation.]" (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 417; see generally Pen. Code, 26 [the class of people who are incapable of committing crimes includes those persons "who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof"].)

Appellant did not ask the court to instruct on the defense of unconsciousness. Nevertheless, "`"[i]t is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case."'" (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154.) This sua sponte duty extends to defenses, such as unconsciousness, "`if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 157; see, e.g., People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 887.)