Is there any difference between a life sentence and the death penalty?

Defendant complains that inmates who are serving a life sentence "are not necessarily more culpable than those serving a determinate sentence and are therefore not necessarily more deserving of execution when they commit fatal assaults while incarcerated." Landry rejected a similar argument, noting that "[s]ection 4500 is a death eligibility statute as opposed to a death selection statute." (Landry , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 106, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 385 P.3d 327 ; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 971-972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750.) In other words, a defendant convicted of violating section 4500 is eligible for the death penalty or, alternatively, life without the possibility of parole. (Landry , at p. 106, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 385 P.3d 327.) It is up

[2 Cal.5th 579]

to the jury to decide whether it will select the death penalty as appropriate. "There is no requirement at the eligibility stage that a narrowly circumscribed class of defendants for whom the death penalty is reasonably justified be further distinguished according to the particular circumstances that led to their eligibility. Rather, that is a question that goes to the selection stage and its individualized determination requirement. Only at that point does the Eighth Amendment require a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence to allow an individualized determination. (Buchanan v. Angelone [ (1998) ] 522 U.S. [269,] 276, 118 S.Ct. 757, 139 L.Ed.2d 702.)" (Id . at p. 108, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 385 P.3d 327.) The reason a defendant was a life prisoner at the time of the charged killing may be a relevant consideration for the jury at the penalty phase. It is not germane, however, to the justification for including such persons in the death-eligible class. (Ibid . )