Is there a procedural default with respect to a claim that malicious use of explosive materials pursuant to 18.C. 924(c)(1) is not a crime of violence?

924(c)(1) with the underlying "crime of violence" being malicious use of explosive materials pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 844(i). Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014) ("One way a petitioner can demonstrate actual innocence is to show in light of subsequent case law that he cannot, as a legal matter, have committed the alleged crime.") Since movant is "actually innocent," his procedural default with respect to his claim that malicious use of explosive materials pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 844(i) is not a "crime of violence" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1) because a person can commit malicious use of explosive materials against his or her own property is excused. Accordingly, movant is entitled to relief on that claim.