Is the act proscribed by section 246 of the California Criminal Code an inherently dangerous felony for purposes of the second degree felony-murder doctrine?

Although our court has not had occasion previously to render a direct holding on the question whether the offense proscribed by section 246 is an [9 Cal.4th 310] inherently dangerous felony for purposes of the second degree felony-murder doctrine, the reasoning and language of one of our prior decisions--People v. Satchell, supra, 6 Cal.3d 28, 98 Cal.Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361--provide a rather clear indication of this court's view on this issue. In Satchell, the court held the felony of possession of a concealable firearm by a felon ( 12021), considered in the abstract, was not inherently dangerous to human life and therefore would not support an instruction on second degree felony murder. The court concluded that "mere passive possession" of a firearm, even by a felon, could not properly supply the element of malice in a murder prosecution. (6 Cal.3d at p. 42, 98 Cal.Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361.) The court went on to say, however, that if passive possession ripened into a felonious act in which danger to human life was inherent, the purposes of the felony-murder rule would be served by its application, because "it is the deterrence of such acts by felons which the rule is designed to accomplish." (6 Cal.3d at p. 43, 98 Cal.Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361.) The court noted that a "ready example" of such a felony was the act proscribed by section 246, discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling. (6 Cal.3d at p. 43, fn. 22, 98 Cal.Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361.)