Is possession with intent to distribute a "continuing" crime?

5 Although possession with intent to distribute has been identified as a "continuing" offense, e.g., United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 911-12 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974), a single such offense only continues so long as it involves a discrete package of drugs, cf. United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191, 193 (9th Cir.1993) (proof of interruption in possession will show separate "continuing" crimes); United States v. Meredith, 824 F.2d 1418, 1426 (4th Cir.) (owing to relationship between continuing offenses and single acts, the crime of possession with intent to distribute merges with crime of distribution "[w]hen the narcotics involved in the possession and distribution ... are the same, and there is no showing of any break in the continuity from the acquisition of the narcotics to their distribution") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 969 (1987), and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 991 (1988). Thus, the district court's assessment that the "one discre[te] act happens to be during the whole year of 1990" is a permissible construction of the indictment only if it refers to the continuous possession of the same package of methamphetamine.

6 These sparse details could render count I of the indictment insufficient for failing to allege enough facts. See United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (9th Cir.1979).