Is pimping a crime of moral turpitude?

Defendant acknowledges that pimping is a morally repugnant practice that involves the corruption of others. (See People v. Jaimez (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 146, 150 [pimping is a crime of moral turpitude].) Because of this, defendant reasons, evidence of such conduct would trigger an emotional reaction, leading to the risk that jurors would convict defendant solely because of his "past character flaws."

"Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) generally prohibits the admission of evidence of a prior criminal act against a criminal defendant 'when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.' Subdivision (b) of that section, however, provides that such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some fact in issue, such as motive, intent, knowledge, identity, or the existence of a common design or plan. [] 'The admissibility of other crimes evidence depends on (1) the materiality of the facts sought to be proved, (2) the tendency of the uncharged crimes to prove those facts, and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion of the evidence.' [Citation.] Evidence may be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 if its probative value is 'substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.' [Citation.] 'Because substantial prejudice is inherent in the case of uncharged offenses, such evidence is admissible only if it has substantial probative value.' [Citation.]" (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 22-23.)