Is giving the instruction that consent is not a defense in a sexual assault case reversible per se or subject to Chapman prejudice review?

I disagree, however, with defendant that giving the instruction violated his federal constitutional rights and is either reversible per se or subject to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. While potentially confusing on aspects of the issue, the instruction did not purport to define the element of commission of the offense by use of force, violence, duress, menace or fear. That element was correctly defined for the jury through other instructions. At most, the instruction that consent is not a defense could have been read as inconsistent with the instructions defining the force or duress element. The error thus did not constitute a "[m]isdescription" of an element requiring either automatic reversal or Chapman prejudice review. ( People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 670, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563.) Neither per se reversal nor the Chapman standard being implicated by the circumstances here, I would apply the prejudice standard applicable to errors of state law;

[51 Cal.4th 257]

reversal is appropriate only if omission of the erroneous instruction would have been reasonably likely to produce a more favorable result on the section 288(b)(1) charges. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836, 299 P.2d 243.)

[51 Cal.4th 257]