Is a state police officer immune from civil action for improper search, seizure and imprisonment?

14 We note the statement in Selico v. Jackson, D.C.S.D.Cal., 1962, 201 F.Supp. 475, Part III, p. 478, "that a public official is immune from civil suit based upon discretionary acts performed within the scope of his authority, regardless of the motives with which he performs his duties, and this immunity is not abrogated by the Civil Rights statutes;" we presume this statement refers to those officials to whom judicial immunity is accorded or some phase of it extended, or to federal law enforcement officers, rather than to state law enforcement officers.

15 The third overt act as set forth in the complaint discussed in Cohen v. Norris reads: (the defendants) "seized the plaintiff and imprisoned him; they searched the plaintiff as well as his automobile; they had no search warrant; nor did they have any warrant of arrest; they filed no charge or complaint against plaintiff; they did not bring him before a magistrate; they had no probable cause to arrest or imprison him."

The fourth overt act as set forth in the complaint under discussion reads: (the defendants) "again seized and imprisoned the plaintiff; they searched him, and did so in the presence of over one hundred persons present at said restaurant, although the plaintiff requested that if they were going to search him, they do so in the kitchen or some place where plaintiff would not be in public view."

It was also alleged generally in another paragraph that each of the acts was committed maliciously and oppressively with the knowledge on the part of the defendants that they were exceeding their authority as police officers and with the knowledge that they were depriving plaintiff of his constitutional rights.