Is a plaintiff entitled to a judgment for attorney fees if they have disclaimed their interest in the lease?

We first consider the judgment for attorney fees and whether it is barred by the disclaimer provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 761.030, subdivision (b). In Stubblefield v. Fickle (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 325, 326-327, 266 P.2d 808, defendants were lessees under an oil and gas lease which included a provision that they would pay the lessors' attorney fees if the lessors brought an action to quiet title against the cloud of the lease. (Id. at p. 326, 266 P.2d 808.) Approximately two years after entering the lease, the lessors served a notice of default, which the lessees ignored; the lessors then filed a quiet title action. (Ibid.) The lessees did not answer, but disclaimed any interest in the land covered by the lease. (Ibid.) Relying on former section 739 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is the predecessor to section 761.030, subdivision (b), the trial court refused to award attorney fees because the defendants had filed a disclaimer. The appellate court reversed, holding that attorneys fees are not part of the costs referred to in former section 739 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the disclaimer filed after the action was brought did not relieve the lessees of their contractual obligation to pay the lessors' attorney fees. (Id. at p. 327, 266 P.2d 808.)