Is a lack of clarifying or pinpoint instruction regarding the relevance of antecedent, third party threats or assaults to defendant's theory of self-defense harmless?

Accordingly, for the reasons provided, we conclude the lack of a clarifying or pinpoint instruction regarding the relevance of antecedent, third party threats or assaults to defendant's theory of self-defense must be deemed harmless, whether assessed under the People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 standard of prejudice or the more stringent Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 standard.

Defendant's last argument is that, even if the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that it could consider third party prior assaults or threats, his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of his constitutional rights by failing to request such an instruction. We disagree. It is well established that where, as here, "the record on appeal fails to show why counsel acted or failed to act in the instance asserted to be ineffective, unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal." (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1068-1069.) This accords with the strong presumption under California law that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. As such, " ' "the defendant must overcome

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