Is a defendant entitled to good conduct credits for time he spent in a drug rehabilitation program as a condition of his probation?

[165 Cal.App.3d 884] Broad contends that he should have been afforded good conduct credits for the time he spent in the drug rehabilitation program as a condition of his probation. He concedes that such credits are not statutorily authorized (see Pen.Code, 2931, 4019), but argues that they are required by equal protection, since denial of such credits would result in different treatment than that afforded defendants incarcerated as a condition of probation. (See generally People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 506-508, 165 Cal.Rptr. 280, 611 P.2d 874.)

The argument lacks merit. There is a compelling state interest in denying conduct credits for time spent in a residential rehabilitation facility as a condition of probation. The concept of giving or taking away time credits might interfere with principles central to operation of the rehabilitation program. Denial of credits involves administrative requirements which the facility may not be equipped to meet. Further, the rationale for affording such credits is absent: the threat of removal from the program is alone sufficient to deter misbehavior, without holding out the possibility of conduct credits for that purpose. (See People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223, 234-235, 157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92 [compelling state interest underlying effective treatment of mentally disordered sex offenders justified legislative determination not to afford good conduct credits against medical commitment periods].)