Is a defendant entitled to be represented by an attorney for one purpose?

It has also been held that the defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to be represented by an attorney for one purpose or at one moment during the course of his trial and to act as his own attorney for another purpose or during [211 Cal.App.2d 8] another moment of the trial. (People v. Jackson, 186 Cal.App.2d 307, 317, 8 Cal.Rptr. 849.) The right to exercise the right to the assistance or nonassistance of counsel may only be invoked in the course of an orderly procedure. (People v. Carlyon, 191 Cal.App.2d 617, 621-622, 12 Cal.Rptr. 813; In re Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701, 709, 108 P.2d 10.) The appellant was required to exercise his choice of counsel reasonably and not through mere caprice. (People v. Gaither, 173 Cal.App.2d 662, 670-671, 343 P.2d 799.) Therefore, it cannot be said that the trial court's order refusing to permit defendant to discharge his attorney and conduct his own defense was erroneous.

Defendant contends that the representation afforded by the court-appointed attorney was so deficient as to have resulted in a miscarriage of justice. This contention is based on the fact that the attorney failed to argue to the jury that defendant was not the man who escaped because of a discrepancy between the spelling of defendant's name on his birth certificate and the spelling of the escapee's name on the prison records. We were unable to agree with defendant's contention. Counsel may well have felt that defendant's argument or contention could have been demolished with ease. The deputy sheriff said that defendant admitted the escape. The guard identified defendant as the missing person. The fingerprint card of the escaped prisoner was in evidence. An examination of the report's transcript indicates that the attorney conducted the defense with considerable competence. His cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses was pointed and effective. It demonstrated a high degree of skill. We are convinced that appellant's real dissatisfaction with his attorney arises from the fact that defendant was convicted. This is not evidence of the incompetency of the defense attorney. (People v. Hartridge, 134 Cal.App.2d 659, 667, 286 P.2d 72.) An attorney is not responsible for the trial of evidence of guilt left by his client.