Is a crime analyst's testimony prejudicial for purposes of determining guilt or innocence?

We believe the crime analyst's testimony is also somewhat analogous to the inherently prejudicial "profile" evidence which was held to be inadmissible for purposes of determining guilt or innocence in People v. Martinez (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1001, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 838. In Martinez, the trial court had allowed into evidence expert police officer testimony regarding how auto theft rings operate to show the defendant had knowledge he was driving a stolen car. The officers testified the defendant's actions and the documents in his possession when arrested were similar to those of known auto thieves. (Id. at pp. 1004-1006, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 838.) The

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" 'the admission of this evidence is nothing more than the introduction of the investigative techniques of law enforcement officers. Every defendant has a right to be tried based on the evidence against him or her, not on the techniques utilized by law enforcement officers in investigating criminal activity.' " (People v. Martinez, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 838.)

The court in Martinez also found the evidence improper under California authority by analogy to several cases concerning the admission of other crimes evidence. (People v. Martinez, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1006-1007, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 838.) We find these authorities instructive.

First, in People v. Jackson (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 655, 62 Cal.Rptr. 208, where evidence of other crimes not proven to be connected to the defendant was found prejudicial, the court noted that: