What is excusability for a lawyer to delay or delay a trial?

Again, Irving v. Irving is closely on point. There, the delay resulted from a recognition that the law would have to change before the plaintiff’s case could succeed. The chambers judge found: . . .even though that reason does not appear to be a particularly commendable reason, nevertheless, I cannot conclude that it should be characterized as inexcusable. The Court of Appeal disagreed: That is not the approach to excusability found in most of the cases. The reason, that the action would probably fail, seems to be a wise reason not to proceed. When tied to a hope that the law will change, it might justify a tactical decision to delay the trial. But the question here is not whether the reason is good or bad, or wise or unwise; it is whether the delay was excusable or inexcusable. A delay as a means of gaining tactical advantage is not to be compared to a delay forced on the plaintiff by negligent solicitors, impecuniosity, or illness. The delay was intentional, calculated to help the plaintiff and therefore hurt the defendants.