What is the test for reasonable care under the rule of “unusual care” in a bank?

Spence, J. then quoted from the judgment of Guy, J.A. in giving the judgment of the court of appeal where he set out the facts of the case including the following (at p. 89): “‘Having regard to the picture presented by all the evidence, I must say that the situation which confronted the plaintiff in the bank on the day in question was a situation so commonplace as to take it out of the category of the “unusual.” The significance of the word “unusual” as it appears in the basic principle of Indermaur v. Dames, supra, seems to me to be this: If the danger is an usual danger, it must be assumed that ordinary, reasonable people know and appreciate it fully. Conversely, if they know and appreciate it, it ceases to be unusual. In my view, to expect anything other than a wet floor on a snowy day in Manitoba in any public place such as a bank, store, post office, school, office, theatre, restaurant, or any of the hundreds of shops that abound in the province, is to deny the everyday realities of life, and is wholly unrealistic and unreasonable.’ “On the other hand, Freedman, J.A., in giving the minority judgment of that court, said at p. 95: “‘One does not normally expect that bank premises to which members of the public customarily resort in large numbers, will be wet and therefore hazardous. Not even under western Canadian winter conditions would it be usual to expect to encounter such a floor. Admittedly, snowstorms outside carry with them the prospect of snow being brought within premises, but that very likelihood imposes upon the occupier the obligation to take some effective measures against hazards thereby created. He cannot stand idly by, do nothing to protect invitees from damage arising from a wet floor, and then simply look to the snowstorm to exonerate him.’ [The italicizing is my own.] “The question of ‘reasonable care’ under the rule in Indermaur v. Dames, supra, will be described hereinafter. “Again, I find myself in agreement with Freedman, J.A., that not even the exigencies of western Canadian winter conditions would make usual the presence on the floor of a large bank in a city of 30,000, in midafternoon, of ‘a dangerous glaze of water underfoot near the tellers’ wickets.’ I am of opinion that the state of the floor in that bank on that afternoon constituted an ‘unusual danger.’ “It is perhaps a test of some value to determine whether a condition is one of unusual danger to investigate the ease by which the occupier might avoid it. In the present case, the learned trial judge said: “‘A cocoa mat some place about would have been useful. Also when the weather was such that people carried in wet snow a few strips of matting to the busy parts of the lobby or even at those busy places would have kept the floor nearly dry.’ “If the danger could have been prevented by these economical and easy precautions then surely a member of the public frequenting such a busy place as this bank would have been entitled to expect such precautions or others equally effective, and their absence would tend to make the danger an ‘unusual’ one. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the condition which confronted the plaintiff as she walked ‘very gingerly’ from the savings wicket towards the ledger wicket was a condition of ‘unusual danger.”