In what circumstances will the trial court erred in not giving the accident and mistake of fact defense?

In this case, we need not decide whether the trial court erred in not giving the pinpoint instructions for accident and mistake of fact because we conclude that, even if the trial court did err, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a more defendant-friendly outcome if it had been so instructed. (People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 830-831 ["Erroneous failure to give a pinpoint instruction is reviewed for prejudice under the [People v.] Waston [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836] harmless error standard."].) Our conclusion is the same even if we accept defendant's request that we review prejudice by asking whether the instructional omission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.

The trial court's decision not to make the accident "defense" available for the assault with a firearm offense was not prejudicial because the jury in this case specifically rejected that defense. Defendant testified that his acts in aiming the gun at his wife and pulling the trigger were an accident; his lawyer argued the shooting was an accident; the court gave the accident instruction as to the battery causing serious bodily injury charge; and the jury nevertheless convicted him of that battery charge. The jury's conviction necessarily rests on a rejection of defendant's accident defense. Because the crime of assault with a firearm has the same "willfulness" intent element as the crime of battery causing serious bodily injury (see People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 (Lara)

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[willfulness as an element of battery]; People v. Wyatt (2008) 48 Cal.4th 776, 780 [willfulness as an element of assault]), the jury's finding that defendant's battery was willfulrather than accidentalapplies with equal force to the assault charge. Given the jury's findings, the accident instruction would not have mattered. For the first time at oral argument, defendant asserted that the jury's acquittal on the infliction of corporal injury on a spouse count necessarily rested on its acceptance of his accident defense, thereby creating some possibility that the jury made inconsistent findings regarding the accident defense. We disagree. The jury's acquittal on the infliction of corporal injury count could rest on several grounds other than its acceptance of the accident defense, including that the crime of inflicting corporal injury requires proof of traumatic injury while battery does not. More to the point, any uncertainty as to why the jury acquitted on the inflicting corporal injury count does not call into question or otherwise negate the jury's unambiguous rejection of the accident defense as to the battery count.