California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from Lungren v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.App.4th 435, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 690 (Cal. App. 1996):
We recognize respondent superior court accorded the Attorney General discretion, in complying with its judgment, to modify the term "affirmative action" by reference to "discrimination" and "preferential treatment." Although, as so qualified, the term would not be overinclusive, we fail to see why the term must be added to describe "the character and real purpose of the proposed measure." (See Tinsley v. Superior Court, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 108, 197 Cal.Rptr. 643.) The Attorney General accurately and completely describes the measure as prohibiting, in public employment, education or contracting, discrimination and preferential treatment on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin. Even if we assume that much, most or all of the impact of the prohibition will be borne by programs commonly associated with the term "affirmative action," we cannot fault the AttorneyGeneral for [48 Cal.App.4th 443] refraining from the use of such an amorphous, value-laden term in the ballot title and ballot label.
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