In what circumstances will the Attorney General argue that challenged evidence at trial is not unduly prejudicial to a jury?

likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as . . . excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the offense." (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917.) We agree with the Attorney General that the challenged evidence was not unduly prejudicial in light of these factors. The evidence was probative of Olivier's inappropriately sexual behavior toward teenage girls, and it evoked the charged conduct in a hot tub. It was also significantly less inflammatory than the evidence of the charged offenses because it involved no physical contact. The court did not abuse its discretion under section 352 in admitting the challenged evidence.

We also reject Olivier's assertion that the trial court's ruling violated his federal due process rights. The admission of evidence does not violate due process unless "it makes the trial fundamentally unfair." (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439, italics omitted.) " 'Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. Even then, the evidence must "be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial." ' " (People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229.) Olivier fails to explain how the evidence at issue rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, and we conclude that it did not.