In what circumstances will the Attorney General argue that a defendant's retrial of his intent to commit a criminal offence would violate the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy?

In his reply brief, defendant develops an argument that the relitigation of his intent, an ultimate fact in the prior case which ended in acquittal, violated the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy because the acquittal in the prior case barred relitigation of the issue in the present case. This argument appears to derive from the general legal principle, cited in the Attorney General's brief, that the double jeopardy clause ¹³ prevents the state from (1) retrying final verdicts, (2) exacting multiple punishments, and (3) relitigating for criminal purposes any facts finally resolved in the defendant's favor in a prior criminal proceeding (the "collateral estoppel" rule). (People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 756, fn. 17, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) The People argued none of the three prohibitions was implicated in this case. With respect to the third, the People argued the evidence in this case was relitigated for an evidentiary purpose, not a criminal purpose. In his reply brief, defendant calls this sophistry.