In what circumstances will a court grant a motion for a new trial in a medical malpractice action predicated upon delayed diagnosis?

In Cullum v. Seifer (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 20, 81 Cal.Rptr. 381, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a new trial in a medical malpractice action predicated upon delayed diagnosis. On defendant's appeal from the order, the court affirmed holding that sufficient evidence supported the order. It acknowledged that the evidence on proximate cause was weak, but noted that expert testimony indicated "with reasonable medical probability that the disease had not affected other lymph areas prior to [the plaintiff's first consultation with the doctor], and that 'a delay would make [the plaintiff] need more treatment.' ... The delay itself prevented more certain proof by plaintiff that had treatment been instituted sooner, her disease would have been arrested or cured. It seems only reasonable to find that an inference may be drawn that plaintiff and her condition fell within that group wherein prompt treatment would have 'confined [her disease] to one place' and 'improved the prognosis.' " (Id. at p. 26, 81 Cal.Rptr. 381.) The court concluded: "We cannot narrowly construe the testimony relative to early prognosis and prompt treatment. We observe testimony throughout the record ... which, if believed, would support the inference that it is a reasonable medical probability that the plaintiff would have been benefited, i.e., by possible lengthening of her life and/or her personal comfort--even if no cure would have resulted from more prompt diagnosis and treatment. These are matters of injury proximately caused by the delay, and support the granting of a new trial." (Id. at pp. 27-28, 81 Cal.Rptr. 381, fn. omitted.)