In support of the complaint in the second action in the case of the Attorney for the executors of the Estate of a deceased, what is the test for liability in negligence?

In support of the complaint in the second action, plaintiffs rely solely upon Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685, wherein the court held that an attorney who was employed by a testator to prepare a will and who was negligent in the performance of this task was liable to the intended beneficiary even though there was no privity of contract between the attorney and the beneficiary. The court stated that the determination whether a defendant would be held liable to a third party not in privity of contract was a matter of policy which involved the balancing of the following factors: 'the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury, and the policy of preventing future harm.' (Lucas v. Hamm, supra, at p. 588, 15 Cal.Rptr. at p. 823, 364 P.2d at p. 687.) Plaintiffs assert that when the allegations of their complaint against the attorneys for the executors are subjected to this balancing test, it becomes apparent that said complaint does state a cause of action in negligence even in the absence of privity of contract.

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Defendant attorneys, on the other hand, assert that Lucas v. Hamm, supra, did not involve a situation, such as that here present, where the only injury resulting from the attorney's negligence consisted of interference with the contractual relations of another. Defendants rely upon Stromer v. City of Yuba City (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 286, 37 Cal.Rptr. 240, as authority for the rule that the courts do not recognize a cause of action for negligent, as opposed to intentional, conduct which interferes with a contract between third parties. We agree.