How have the New York State Commissioners dealt with a claim for damages brought by a property owner against the state for the destruction of his property?

There is no claim, in the case under consideration, that the commissioners did not act at all; but complaint is made that their duties were of such a nature as to require them to act in the particular manner desired by the relator. What was the character of their duties under the section already quoted? An analysis of that section shows that they had three questions to determine: (1) Had the title of the people failed? (2) Did a legal claim for compensation exist? (3) Was the claim presented by the person entitled thereto? How were the commissioners[149 N.Y. 32]to determine these questions? Clearly, upon satisfactory evidence tending to establish the facts making it their duty to refund. They were to decide, in the first place, whether the title of the state had failed. While the record of a judgment in ejectment recovered by a third person against the purchaser from the people would ordinarily be conclusive as to the failure of title, it would not necessarily be so, for it might appear that the judgment was recovered through fraud and collusion, and without notice to the state. In this case the relator relied upon the cancellation of the taxes by the comptroller as in the nature of a judgment; but that act was done at his own request, upon evidence furnished by him, and with no apparent necessity or reason therefor, except to make it the basis of this large claim against the state. In other words, he attacked his own title, and succeeded, as he claims, in persuading a state officer to destroy it. His possession has not been disturbed, so far as appears. No one seems to have questioned his title except himself. He is in no position to recover from a grantor conveying with the usual covenants of warranty. He has lost nothing, as yet. For aught that appears, he can always remain in the undisturbed enjoyment of the lands. If any one has ever demanded possession, or made a claim on account of the timber taken from the premises, the record before us does not disclose it. Under these circumstances, were the commissioners bound, as a matter of law, to decide each of said questions in favor of the relator? Did the law give them no latitude of action? Were they obliged to believe his affidavits, or to accept the evidence offered by him as conclusive? Had they no power to decide, except as he wanted them to decide? Were they not called upon to exercise judgment in passing upon the effect of the evidence? People ex rel. Millard v. Chapin, supra. These questions suggest the nature of their duties, which required the consideration of evidence and an adjudication thereupon. Their decision, refusing restitution to the relator, was a judicial determination, involving the exercise of judgment upon questions of both fact and law. [149 N.Y. 33]Their duties, under the section in question, were not ministerial, but judicial, in character, and performance thereof in a particular manner cannot be enforced by mandamus. Even if their decision was clearly wrong, some other remedy must be adopted, for this writ does not lie for the correction of errors.