How have the courts treated a motion to withdraw a no contest plea?

Defendant argues that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof in denying his motion to withdraw the plea, and urges us to remand the matter for the trial court to reconsider the motion under the proper standard. Defendant moved to withdraw his plea on two grounds: (1) ignorance of the plea's immigration consequences, which must be shown by clear and convincing evidence ( 1018); and (2) counsel's constitutionally deficient immigration advice, which must be accompanied by a showing of prejudice (i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient advice, defendant would not have entered his no contest plea to charges subjecting him to mandatory deportation). (People v. Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 901.) While the trial court appears to have conflated the two bases for relief by concluding that defendant had not established prejudice by clear and convincing evidence, the error is harmless in light of our own review of defendant's Sixth Amendment claim and conclusion that he failed to show prejudice even applying a lesser standard of proof.

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by accepting his plea "without a determination of an adequate factual basis," as required under section 1192.5. The trial court accepted defendant's plea after asking his attorney whether "there's a factual basis for the plea," to which counsel responded affirmatively. The Attorney General argues that the trial court satisfied its statutory duty by accepting defendant's stipulation to a factual basis for the plea, citing People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110.