How have the courts interpreted the opinion of a jury in a sexual assault case?

Additionally, the court improperly refused to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from defendant's silence at the time of the attorney's assertions to the police at the precinct. Although this case does not implicate a defendant's absolute right to remain silent in the face of accusatory statements or questions by law enforcement officials (see, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d

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Although neither defendant nor his attorney testified at trial, the trial court nevertheless was aware from the hearing testimony that defendant's silence was at the instruction of his attorney. Although the proposition that defendant had adopted by silence his attorney's admission was not explicitly put before the jury (cf., People v. Conrow, 200 N.Y. 356, 93 N.E. 943), the jury nevertheless heard testimony from which it could have inferred that defendant's silence was an adoption or corroboration of his attorney's assertions about him. Thus, we conclude that the trial court was required to guard against the adverse inference that silence might be used as evidence against the defendant and to give a curative instruction.