How have the courts interpreted mitigation and aggravation in a murder case?

In this case, the special instructions the court gave made these definitions particularly unnecessary. At defense request, the court gave a special instruction pinpointing the defense mitigating evidence the jury could consider, while making clear that the wide range of possible mitigation was not limited to that evidence. (Cf. People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 805-806, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330 [trial court not required to give such pinpoint instructions].) Moreover, the court itemized the other crimes evidence and evidence of convictions that the jury could considerthe only aggravating evidence the prosecution presentedand specifically told the jury it could not consider any other criminal activity or convictions in aggravation. In light of these instructions, it is hard to imagine how defendant could have desired, or benefited from, any other instruction defining mitigation and aggravation in general terms. The actual instructions fully protected defendant's interests.

Defendant makes two other instructional contentions that we have repeatedly rejected and continue to do so. The trial court need not (1) instruct the jury that it may impose the death penalty only if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty or (2) impose on the prosecution the burden of persuasion. (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 852-853, 862, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 643, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.)¹¹